Opinion on The Finnish Climate Fund (Ilmastorahasto) Strategy by Marois, Thomas
INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND PUBLIC PURPOSE
Communities worldwide are faced with huge challenges 
that require systems change only possible through 
significant transformation. The impacts of COVID-19 
have helped reveal that to solve complex societal 
challenges requires us to address questions of power and 
participation, from the details of service provision to the 
underlying structures of society itself. Yet we have also 
learned that it is possible to take on short- and long-term 
innovation to equitably address societal ‘grand challenges’ 
by organising around bold, ambitious missions; to ‘flatten 
the curve’, not only on COVID-19, but on the fundamental 
crises of climate change, social justice and poverty.
To tackle the fissures exposed by COVID-19 and pursue 
public value, it is critical to recognise that markets will 
not find sustainable, inclusive, green and innovation-
led economic growth on their own. Rather, direction is 
needed from both the public and private sectors working 
together to co-create and co-shape markets to foster 
societal change. The role of finance is vital in helping to 
move us from the infrastructure of today’s economy to an 
infrastructure that is ready to take on grand challenges, 
notably climate change and global decarbonisation. 
Finance, however, is not neutral; the type of finance 
available can affect both the investments made and the 
type of activity that occurs.
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Patient, long-term, committed finance can underpin 
transformative climate action if properly structured and 
governed. Public banks and investment funds have 
underpinned societal development for generations. 
Recently, these public financial institutions have received 
resurgent interest in their potential to become key actors 
driving green and just growth, and innovation, often aimed 
at tackling societal challenges. The UCL Institute for 
Innovation and Public Purpose (IIPP) has been leading the 
charge on rethinking, researching and policy engagement 
around public financial institutions, and on how they can 
become mission-oriented, market-shaping institutions 
capable of directing the move towards the inclusive, 
equitable and sustainable societies that we need.
As emphasised in the 2021 Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report, the 
problem of how to finance green transitions and climate 
change mitigation is urgent. Likewise, the European Green 
Deal has set ambitious climate change targets that require 
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financing if they are to be reached. It is in this context 
that the Finnish Climate Fund (Ilmastorahasto) requested 
that the IIPP provide a written opinion on its Climate Fund 
Strategy (version 1 April 2021), which in turn provides 
the content for this policy brief. The Finnish Climate Fund 
agreed to publish this as a contribution to the wider policy 
and academic community. The policy brief/opinion focuses 
on the Climate Fund Strategy’s ability to deliver climate 
impact. 
The opinion and policy brief have been prepared by Dr 
Thomas Marois, IIPP Senior Research Fellow, Patient 
Finance and Public Banking. The content provides neither 
an IIPP endorsement nor a repudiation of the Finnish 
Climate Fund Strategy. The opinion is based on an in-depth 
review of the Climate Fund Strategy document and it offers 
a series of reflections that the Climate Fund may consider 
in its future operations. 
 
Summary
Patient, long-term, committed finance can underpin 
transformative climate action if properly structured and 
governed. The Finnish Climate Fund Strategy aims to 
situate the institution as a driver of green, high-impact 
climate financing. This opinion focuses on five areas that 
are important to the Fund maximising climate impact. 
The first area relates to ‘realising the potential of public 
ownership’. Public ownership is a foundational element 
of the Climate Fund’s potential to deliver patient finance 
for climate impact. It enables the Fund to focus not on 
maximising returns, but on public purpose climate goals 
for people and planet. This important potential of public 
ownership should continue to guide how the Climate Fund 
operates and presents itself within society.
The second area relates to ‘maximising the Climate 
Fund’s mission and impact-orientation’. The Climate 
Fund’s orientation towards generating climate impact is 
strongly represented within the Strategy and within its 
institutional mission. The Strategy’s pre-conditions provide 
a firm ‘floor’ for subsequent climate-oriented investment 
decisions. There may be room to strengthen wording as 
a complement to European Union (EU) ‘do no significant 
harm’ conditions in the pre-conditions and to offer a vision 
of how the Fund connects climate impacts to 
societal impacts.
The third area relates to ‘targets and ways of financing’. 
The Climate Fund’s initial focus for funding targets climate 
solutions and platforms for emissions reductions. In time, 
the Strategy may benefit from developing an explicit 
missions approach to increase impact.
The fourth area relates to ‘scope for coordination, planning, 
and cooperation’. The Strategy provides an opportunity for 
the Climate Fund to take a pioneering role as a committed 
agent of change, externally and internally, by developing 
coordination, planning and cooperation capacities to tackle 
grand societal challenges like climate change 
and decarbonisation.
The fifth area relates to ‘the importance of monitoring 
and conditionalities’. It is a strength of the Strategy that it 
provides for monitoring throughout the life of the project 
to guide directionality and to ensure funding impact. The 
Climate Fund may consider strategically developing its 
in-house capacity and expertise capable of monitoring 
investments and impacts, and developing a type of Climate 
Fund branding that acts as a signal of climate excellence 
within the market.
The Finnish Climate Fund Strategy
The Finnish Climate Fund (Ilmastorahasto) was founded in 
2020 out of the State Development Company, Vake, as a 
100 per cent state-owned special-assignment company. 
The Climate Fund belongs to the administrative branch 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. The 
Climate Fund is intended to supplement public sector 
investments by funding private and public projects where 
its involvement ‘is crucial for the project's success or will 
enable it to be realised earlier or on a larger scale’ (3)*. 
The Climate Fund’s involvement should supplement other 
public and private funding. In broad terms, the Climate 
Fund uses capital loans and other instruments to finance 
industrial scale-ups of climate solutions and platforms that 
enable emission reductions. The Climate Fund initially has 
about EUR 85 million of available funds. The Government 
will further capitalise the Fund with an additional EUR 300 
million, with additional capitalisations possible by 2022. 
This opinion points to where the Climate Fund Strategy 
is well-positioned to provide catalytic funding in support 
* Italicised numbers in brackets refer to specific page numbers in the Climate Fund Strategy.
Source: Finnish Climate Fund
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of environmental sustainability in Finland, and suggests 
options and alternatives to enhance its climate impact. It 
does so in five sections: realising the potential of public 
ownership; maximising the Climate Fund’s mission and 
impact-orientation; targets and ways of financing; scope for 
coordination, planning and cooperation; and the importance 
of monitoring and conditionalities.
Realising the potential of public 
ownership
Public ownership is a foundational element of the Finnish 
Climate Fund’s potential to deliver patient finance for 
climate impact, to shape markets and to catalyse green 
transitions. State institutions and public authorities do more 
than just fix markets; they can ‘tilt’ social and economic 
change in new directions, including towards green and 
just transitions (Mazzucato 2018). Public institutions can 
and often do play a dynamic co-creating and direction-
setting role (Mazzucato 2021). This includes public 
financial institutions, which can perform a vital function in 
developing and offering effective and innovative sets of 
dynamic capabilities within the public sector (Kattel and 
Mazzucato 2018; Mazzucato 2021; cf. Marois 2021).
As a public financial institution, the Climate Fund can be 
made more responsive to demands for climate action as 
a matter of public policy and as a reflection of societal 
demands for change. It is by being located within the public 
sphere of the Finnish state that the Climate Fund can be 
potentially, if not necessarily, shielded from direct market 
forces that often compel financial institutions to respond 
to short-term and profit-maximising conditions (Marois 
2021b). Because it has been given a public purpose 
mandate to generate climate and societal impact, the 
Climate Fund can function differently than private financial 
institutions. As the Climate Fund Strategy notes, ‘The 
company can take bigger risks or accept smaller profits 
in its investment activities than private investors would. 
Instead of seeking to maximise its own profit, the Climate 
Fund aims at fulfilling its mission as efficiently as possible 
and creating societal impact.’ 
While this trajectory must be pursued in Finland within 
the limits of EU state aid regulations (3; 16), it opens up 
multiple possibilities of how to realise climate impact and 
to create ‘public value’ according to its public purpose. 
Public value is ‘created by public sector actors creating 
and co-shaping markets in line with public purpose. This 
direction-setting role enables public, private and civil 
society sectors to collaborate effectively to solve societal 
problems’ (Mazzucato and Ryan-Collins 2019). Moreover, 
there are direct and indirect ways that public institutions 
create public value, including at the individual, industry 
and societal scales (Mazzucato et al. 2020). The role the 
Climate Fund serves in creating public value and fulfilling 
public purpose should figure prominently internally, as a 
part of its institutional culture, and externally, as part of 
how the Fund presents itself externally in society. In turn, 
this can provide a foundation for fostering public financial 
institutional collaboration to tackle the global challenge of 
accelerating climate change (see below).
Importantly, public ownership provides a potential 
alternative to private finance, which has tended to take 
a more financialised and profit-oriented approach to 
financing climate change mitigation projects, which 
can undermine its capacity to drive innovative and 
transformative climate solutions (Mazzucato 2015; EPSC 
2017). The drive for returns can manifest in climate actions 
problems such as greenwashing. Public ownership in itself 
does not guarantee an alternative, but it does provide an 
enabling environment for the Climate Fund to take a more 
focused and proactive approach that does not place profits 
before people and planet. Democratic, transparent and 
accountable governing practices can help ensure public 
purpose continues to meaningfully guide Climate Fund 
operations (Mazzucato and Ryan-Collins 2019; 
Marois 2021).
Maximising the Climate Fund’s mission 
and impact-orientation
The Climate Fund’s orientation towards generating climate 
impact is strongly represented within the Strategy and 
its institutional mission. The Fund was established to 
help Finland achieve carbon neutrality (3). The Strategy 
provides a clear statement on this: ‘The mission of the 
Climate Fund is thematically defined as combating climate 
change, boosting low-carbon industry and promoting 
digitalisation. Instead of maximising returns, the company 
seeks to maximise societal impact in line with its mission’ 
(4; 9). Therein, the Climate Fund aims to decrease Finland's 
carbon footprint, strengthen its carbon handprint, and 
promote innovative climate solutions and digital 
solutions (3). 
To this end, the Strategy sets out a series of funding pre-
conditions related to climate impact (4-5). The Strategy 
aligns the Climate Fund with the principle of ‘do no 
significant harm’ to any of the six environmental objectives 
of the EU’s sustainable investment framework (notably 
climate change mitigation; climate change adaptation; 
sustainable use and protection of water and marine 
resources; transition to a circular economy; pollution 
prevention and control; and protection and restoration of 
biodiversity and ecosystems). 
The pre-conditions provide a firm ‘floor’ for subsequent 
climate-oriented investment decisions. Based on this, the 
Climate Fund is to prioritise and select investments based 
on impact. The Climate Fund’s funding criteria specifies 
two core impacts: 1) emission reductions or 2) productivity 
potential and/or business potential (2). The Strategy also 
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notes the Climate Fund’s general impact criteria, which 
include emission reduction potential; productivity potential; 
alignment with the EU taxonomy; and business potential, 
productivity benefits and added value (5-6). The Strategy 
also refers to seeking ‘societal impact’ from 
time to time (7). 
Notwithstanding the strength of putting climate impact 
as a forceful pre-condition, two considerations can be 
raised. First, the Climate Fund may wish to include explicit 
wording in the pre-conditions specifying that investments 
‘must’ contribute positively to climate change mitigation, 
emissions reductions, biodiversity or environmental 
sustainability. It may not be the case for the Climate 
Fund, but where climate finance strategies elsewhere 
have allowed flexibility between productivity and climate 
gains, productivity and/or economic growth benefits 
can outweigh climate gains (see, for example, Nordic 
Investment Bank reporting, NIB 2021 and 2021b; Marois 
2021). Wording that emphasises an explicit positive climate 
requirement can complement the pre-condition’s existing 
EU phrasing of ‘do no significant harm’, which offers a
band of interpretation and does not explicitly require that 
investments positively benefit the environment. 
Second, the Climate Fund may consider adding wording 
that offers a vision of how it connects, conceptually 
and in terms of causality, its climate impacts to societal 
impacts. This is an under-developed feature of the finance 
industry in general and an area where the Fund can exert 
leadership. How does the Climate Fund understand these 
relationships? There may be an opportunity to explore other 
public financial institutions with explicit ‘social’ missions, 
like the Council of Europe Development Bank. Specifying 
the societal purpose of its climate mission can help to 
bolster the Climate Fund’s long-term institutional credibility 
within Finnish society.
Targets and ways of financing
The Climate Fund’s Board of Directors has decided to 
initially focus funding operations on 1) scaling up the 
deployment of climate solutions and 2) platforms enabling 
emissions reduction (10). The first focus targets companies 
that are looking to expand commercial activities, that meet 
the preconditions and that show promise to generate 
significant climate impact. The second focus targets 
entities looking for funding for ‘shared testing or piloting 
infrastructure for emission reductions, carbon binding or 
climate solutions, or digital platforms that promote the use 
of data for reducing emissions’ (10). The Climate Fund aims 
to dedicate about 65 per cent of investments to climate 
change and about 35 per cent to digitalisation, all of which 
is fundamentally shaped by its climate mission (9). Therein, 
the Climate Fund ‘does not specify the types of projects or 
companies it invests in any more precisely than set out in 
its funding criteria and categories’ and it does not ‘decide 
in advance which technologies or specific climate solutions 
it will fund and by how much,’ Instead, it focuses on its 
funding criteria and categories (7).
It is a strength of the Strategy that its focus for funding is 
guided by a clear climate challenge. Importantly, funding 
is not oriented towards picking specific types of industrial 
‘winners’ or towards focusing on a specific economic sector 
for growth. This allows for flexibility and can help to avoid 
institutional or mission capture by any particular business, 
industry or sector in ways that might undermine the Climate 
Fund’s public purpose and climate impact ambitions. It is 
likewise understood that funding is not constrained by a 
client’s ownership, with financing being open to public and 
private entities capable of delivering climate impact.
The Climate Fund may benefit from exploring options 
around specific mission-oriented investment strategies that 
direct funding within the larger grand challenge of climate 
change mitigation. Climate missions would not alter the 
broad climate directive given to the Climate Fund, but they 
might help to identify and target priorities, and assist in 
maximising impact. For example, the Climate Fund already 
takes into consideration the broad operating environment 
in its investment targets, as illustrated by the ‘Operating 
environment analysis process’. A missions approach could 
assist in synthesising influences from global to sectoral 
levels and help to feed that information into a climate 
strategy aimed at confronting societally relevant missions 
that confront the challenge of climate change. Mission-
oriented policy focuses on problem-specific societal 
challenges, aiming to draw in many different sectors and 
actors in seeking a resolution. The problem-oriented 
mission approach represents a wide range of projects and 
technologies that as a whole encourages new types of 
collaborations between public and private actors to solve 
the problems in ways that have more potential for spill 
overs than via a sectoral approach to funding (Mazzucato 
2019; Mazzucato and Dibb 2019; Mazzucato and Mikheeva 
2020, 22). A missions example on plastic-free oceans 
(Figure 1), taken from a report on the EIB report, helps to 
illustrate the point.
In a missions framework, a ‘grand challenge’ is defined 
as ‘a difficult but important, systemic and society-wide 
problem with no ‘silver bullet’ solution’. A ‘mission’ is defined 
as ‘a concrete target, an achievable step towards a grand 
challenge that contextualises projects’. Therein, a ‘project’ 
specifies ‘a single, isolated, clearly defined innovation 
activity with risky or uncertain outcomes’ (Mazzucato and 
Mikheeva 2020, 17).
There is the potential added benefit that defining a 
mission-oriented framework within the Climate Fund may 
assist the Fund in its strategy of leveraging EU resources 
and seeking out collaborative European Investment Bank 
(EIB) funding (14). Given EU commitments to a climate-
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neutral continent and the EIB Climate Bank Roadmap 
2021-2025 strategy in support of the European Green 
Deal, there is increased scope for collaboration. Therein, 
the European Commission (EC) has begun working with 
mission-oriented innovation to confront societal challenges, 
including climate change [see reports published by the 
Commission on Mission-Oriented Policy (Mazzucato 
2018b) and Governance of Missions (Mazzucato 2019)]. 
In the case of the EIB, one of the main recommendations 
is that climate missions ‘require patient, long-term finance, 
but also finance that is willing to take on higher risks’ 
(Mazzucato and Mikheeva 2020, 15). The Climate Fund is 
well-positioned on this front.
In time, the Climate Fund’s ways of funding will include 
equity financing, debt financing and mezzanine funding. 
In the early stages, however, the Climate Fund Strategy 
notes that it will focus on capital loans to a maximum of 
50 per cent of total funding. There may be scope here 
to develop collaborative partnerships with other public 
financial institutions to co-finance high-impact climate 
projects (see below). The Climate Fund Strategy notes that 
it may also establish and contribute to special investment 
funds (12). So long as rigorous climate conditionalities can 
be attached to these funds to give them a clear climate 
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Figure 1: The EIB and a plastic-free oceans mission
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Presently, the Climate Fund Strategy states that it will not 
participate in projects deemed as state aid, and this limits 
the use of grants and other subsidised support to fund 
planning or project demonstration work. This may be an 
area to revisit in the future, as subsidised support can play 
an important role in supporting innovation. Similarly, the 
Strategy specifies that the Climate Fund can ‘take the role 
of owner for the duration of the investment’. While this may 
not be an immediate term priority, the equity option can 
open opportunities for the Fund to share in the rewards 
of climate investments, not just the risks, in ways that 
can support climate impact objectives. Additionally, the 
Strategy’s funding target for ‘climate solutions’ is worded  
in terms of being geared towards the private sector, while 
funding for ‘platforms’ is worded as being more open to 
public and private sectors. The Climate Fund may wish 
to support and foster high-impact public sector climate 
solutions as part of its Strategy.
The Climate Fund is required to be financially sustainable 
and self-sustaining. The Strategy suggests that this will be 
assessed over time and without the pressure of responding 
to quarterly shareholder demands: ‘when assessed as a 
whole, its investments and funding must be self-supporting 
in the long term’ (3-4; 12;16). This should enable the 
Climate Fund to prioritise climate impacts by offering 
patient finance across a portfolio of investments without 
having to respond to short-term financial return pressures. 
The Climate Fund’s public purpose is a key element of 
this distinctive public purpose funding strategy. It is worth 
noting that in the long-term the Climate Fund’s Board aims 
for investments to break even (that is, to achieve a 100 per 
cent rate of return over time). However, the Strategy singles 
out the financial risk entailed in the Fund’s income revenue 
derived from its 8.3 per cent stake in Neste (a Finnish 
state-owned oil company). To the extent that this income 
stream might hinder the Climate Fund’s ability to deliver 
patient, long-term and stable climate finance impact, the 
Board may consider ways of mitigating the risks of 
this revenue stream through diversification.
Scope for coordination, planning and 
cooperation
The Strategy offers scope for the Climate Fund to play a 
pioneering role as a committed agent of change, externally 
and internally, by developing coordination, planning and 
cooperation capacities directed towards realising high-
impact climate financing (cf. Mazzucato and Mikheeva 
2020). Realising these capacities could provide important 
demonstration effects within the quickly evolving climate 
finance sector. Publicly-owned financial institutions, 
like the Fund, are uniquely placed to assume the lead 
transformative roles needed to tackle grand societal 
challenges like climate change and decarbonisation 
(and including COVID-19) (Mazzucato and Penna 2016; 
McDonald et al. 2020; Marois 2021).
Externally, the Climate Fund can build on its status as 
a public institution and on its funding strategy to seek 
out partnerships with the EIB to work strategically with 
other peer financial institutions nationally, regionally and 
across the EU. Nationally, the Climate Fund can explore 
cooperative partnerships and climate expertise-building 
relationships with other national financial actors, such 
as MuniFin, Finnvera and Finnfund. Regionally, there is 
scope to forge coordination, planning and cooperative 
relationships in terms of financial leveraging and expertise-
building. This could encompass coordination and planning 
relationships with the Nordic Investment Bank and with 
similar climate funds, such as the Danish Green Investment 
Fund, the Dutch Invest-NL and so on. The Climate Fund 
could take a lead demonstration role by including in its 
Strategy an obligation to foster public financial institution 
collaborations, taking a role in devising the most innovative 
and cooperative climate financing strategies globally. 
In doing so, this too would help develop the Climate 
Fund’s brand nationally, regionally and internationally as a 
preeminent climate financier. There is an enormous public 
and private sector appetite to make progress on climate 
finance in ways that eliminate greenwashing approaches 
and foster substantive transformation. Public-led 
coordination, planning and cooperation is one way to foster 
that kind of transformational potential.
There is also scope for the Climate Fund to ensure internal 
institutional synergies. The Climate Fund Strategy specifies 
that the ‘operating model has been designed to generate 
the societal impact specified in its operational guidelines 
as efficiently as possible’ (6). To do so the Climate Fund is 
institutionally divided four functions (15): 1) investments, 2) 
customer and deal flow, 3) communications and 4) finance 
and administration. This is an expected operating structure. 
However, as the Climate Fund expands operations and 
becomes an increasingly complex and busy organisation, 
it will be vital that mechanisms and procedures are in 
place from an early stage to ensure that Climate Fund 
financing decisions do not become siloed according to 
Source: Finnish Climate Fund
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pre-established institutional functions. In other words, 
what internal forums can be put in place to develop a 
culture of knowledge sharing, co-creation of knowledge 
and collective risk-taking within the Climate Fund wherein 
the best inputs from staff across the organisation can be 
expressed and heard (cf. Kattel and Mazzucato 2018)? 
As a nascent institution, there is an opportunity to craft an 
organisational culture of intra-institutional collaboration and 
understanding. Developing such inclusive forums within the 
Climate Fund could help to facilitate similar opportunities 
with other public financial institutions within the region, 
where promising climate finance practices can be shared 
and supported collaboratively. 
The importance of monitoring and 
conditionalities
A strength of the Climate Fund Strategy is that it provides 
for monitoring throughout the life of the project to guide 
directionality and to ensure funding impact (8). The 
Strategy specifies that the terms of the investment are also 
often tied to the realisation or verification of the sought-
after impact. The Climate Fund’s ability to set conditions 
on investments and link disbursements to climate-related 
indicators and impacts is a powerful direction-setting lever 
for the Fund.
pIt is worth highlighting that monitoring should move 
beyond retrospective data collection and analysis. To help 
maximise its climate finance impacts and to support market 
shaping directionality, monitoring and evaluation should be 
present from the start of the funding process and ongoing, 
and thus able to provide dynamic feedback to the Climate 
Fund. By making monitoring part of the funding process 
and project expectations, this should minimise the burden 
of data collection and avoid the problems associated with 
reporting after the fact (and once nothing can be done to 
change direction) (cf. Mazzucato et al. 2020, 40).
There are two further points that the Climate Fund might 
wish to consider. First, on monitoring, the Fund may wish 
to develop in-house capacity and expertise that is capable 
of monitoring investments and impacts. While this would 
not necessarily exclude external support, amassing 
internal capacity should augment the Fund’s ability to 
judge investments across the entire decision timeline, from 
inception to completion. The lack of in-house capacity, 
by contrast, could present a barrier to the Fund’s ability 
to make long-term and strategic investment decisions 
(cf. Mikheeva 2019). Having internal capacity supports 
continuous learning that can stretch beyond the immediate 
financing of specific projects and promote innovation, 
as well as collaboration among peer institutions (cf. 
Mazzucato and Mikheeva 2020, 25-26). This can include 
providing expert public financial sector inputs to wider 
government climate strategies as a matter of the Climate 
Fund’s public purpose. From sub-national public financial 
institutions in North Dakota and Alberta to national ones in 
France, Germany, India, China and so on, this has been an 
important and time-tested public purpose function (Anielski 
and Ascah 2018; Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2018; 
Marois 2021).
Second, on conditionalities, the Fund may need to explore 
and experiment with different types of performance 
incentives on top of the baseline funding conditions. For 
example, in cases where the funded project exceeds 
its climate impact projections, the Fund can provide 
rewards in the form of interest rate rebates, financial 
benefits or other non-financial incentives. In terms of non-
financial incentives, for example, the Climate Fund could 
develop a ‘stamp of excellence’ that could emerge as an 
industry standard or mark of climate impact superiority 
or excellence, which in turn has value to clients in the 
market. This has been done by the KfW in Germany and 
the Nordic Investment Bank (Marois 2017 and 2021). In 
terms of financial incentives, historically public financial 
institutions have exercised such ‘duty losses’ to encourage 
structural economic and social transformation more rapidly 
than would otherwise be possible (Marois and Güngen 
2016). The costs incurred should not be seen as a barrier. 
Vitally, however, any costs incurred for impact-oriented 
performance incentives, to the extent they create losses, 
need to be covered by government transfers so as to not 
undermine the financial sustainability of the Fund. This 
approach may be hampered by EU state aid limitations. As 
regards the urgent challenge of climate change, the Fund 
and its owners may consider lobbying the European Union 
or working with the European Association of Public Banks 
to alter state aid limits relative to climate investments.
Concluding observations
The Climate Fund emerges at a time when it is not 
only necessary that it takes concerted action towards 
confronting climate change, but also when public opinion 
and economic thinking are aligned with public financial 
institutions doing so. This is reflected in an increasingly 
positive worldview towards the catalytic potential of 
public financial institutions that has emerged since the 
2008-09 global financial crisis and, notably, since the 
2015 Paris Agreement. Patient public financing provided 
in accordance with public purpose can prove to be the 
difference between reaching global climate targets and 
missing them. In this, public climate funds and financial 
institutions must be prepared to take bold action, ensuring 
that the funds employed reduce carbon emissions and 
protect against further environmental degradation. 
However, green transitions must also be socially just in 
order to preserve their credibility and vitality. New green 
jobs must be created that provide decent livings for people
and equitable opportunities for all. To fail on the social 
equity side is to risk our collective ability to deliver on 
climate action. As such, the Climate Fund’s Strategy may
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consider developing its approach to social impact by linking 
climate action to just transitions in ways that promise to 
reduce existing social- and gender-based inequalities. 
Such forward-looking climate planning and bold societal 
aspirations can place the Finnish Climate Fund at the 
forefront of innovative public purpose financial institutions 
in global efforts to reverse climate change.
About this brief
This work is the product of an IIPP consultancy to review 
and support the Finnish Climate Fund Strategy, awarded 
in July 2021. The Finnish Climate Fund (Ilmastorahasto) 
website can be accessed at www.ilmastorahasto.fi/
en/. This policy brief is based exclusively on the original 
content of the opinion delivered to the Finnish Climate 
Fund in August 2020. It refers to the 1 April 2021 version 
of the Finnish Climate Fund Strategy. The content of the 
opinion and this brief benefitted from wider IIPP support. I 
would like to acknowledge the contributions to its framing 
from Rainer Kattel, Deputy Director of IIPP, Josh Ryan-
Collins, Head of Finance and Macroeconomics, and Olga 
Mikheeva, Research Fellow in Public Banking. This policy 
brief is published with the consent of the Finnish Climate 
Fund.
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